challenges are appropriate (e.g., why we shouldn't respond with indifference to the charge that we don't know that what we're saying is true). (2014: 1355-1356) 5 On behalf of the Truth View, I respond to these concerns in two steps. First, I draw a distinction between there being a reason or warrant for φing and a person's having that reason or warrant for φing (Whiting 2013: 856) . That Psycho is showing might be a reason for Janet to go to the cinema but, if Janet does not so much as suspect that it is, it cannot be a reason Janet has for going -it cannot be her reason for going. Likewise, that she holds a ticket might be a warrant for Janet to enter the cinema but, if Janet has no idea whether she has a ticket or not, it cannot be a warrant she has for entering.
Second, I argue 6 that the fact that p is a reason or warrant a subject possesses if and only if she knows that p (see Whiting 2013: §4).
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By appeal to these independently plausible ideas, the proponent of TN can say that there is a warrant for a subject to make an assertion just in case what she asserts is true, but add that the subject has this warrant just in case she knows that it is true. So, if Janet asserts that Hitchcock directed Psycho without knowing that he did, she asserts what there is warrant for asserting but she does not do so with that warrant.
In view of this, the proponent of TN can agree that there are true propositions which subjects lack the warrant to assert -hence, that subjects would be criticisable for asserting them -even though a warrant for doing so exists. 8 In addition, she can explain why 'How do you know?' constitutes a challenge to assertion. To say this need not be to query the 5 Critics also argue that truth is not necessary for there to be warrant to assert a proposition (see Lackey 2007) . Since Littlejohn and I are concerned with the clash between TN and KN, and since both entail that one may assert that p only if p, I shall set this issue aside for another occasion. 6 Following Hornsby (2008) , Hyman (1999) , and Unger (1975) . 7 Littlejohn notes that Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Schroeder (2011) argue that one can have that p as a reason for doing something even though one does not know that p. That is right. But they do not argue that one can have the fact that p as a reason for doing something if one does not know that p. It is the latter claim I rely on in my defence of TN. Since Littlejohn sets this issue aside, I shall do the same. 8 The background thought here is that, if you ought not to perform a certain act unless some condition obtains, and you perform that act in ignorance of whether the condition obtains, you are in that respect criticisable (e.g., as reckless), even if the relevant condition happens to obtain. There is, of course, more to say here but this is not the part of the account Littlejohn challenges.
existence of a warrant for asserting, but it is to query the possession of such warrant. To concede this is to concede KN.
It is important to stress that Littlejohn is not here challenging, at least not directly, the proponent of TN's account of what it is that warrants assertion, namely, its truth. One might deny this and claim instead that what warrants an assertion is, say, evidence of its truth. A proponent of this view might follow me and distinguish there being warrant (i.e. there being evidence) for an assertion and a person's having that warrant (i.e. having that evidence).
Indeed, it is commonplace that there can be evidence which a subject do not possess. What
Littlejohn is challenging is specifically the claim that there can be a warrant -irrespective of what provides it -without someone's having it.
Whether No Gap undermines my argument depends on how it is to be understood, in particular, on what it means in this context to say that a subject has a permission (or warrant).
According to Littlejohn, 'the right reading of "having" is the reading according to which having a permission is simply a matter of there being a permission that pertains to one ' (2014: 1359 It is not clear to me that the notion is paradoxical. But, if it is, that suggests that it is a constraint on something's being a permission, and hence a warrant, for someone to φ that she is able to φ in light of or with that permission or warrant. 13 If such a constraint holds, one can appeal to it in defence of TN. If I am unable to assert a proposition like M in light of M, there cannot be a warrant for doing so. 14 As promised, this offers a response to Littlejohn's first point.
Sociology
In addition to his 'philosophical' objections, Littlejohn makes a 'sociological' point:
The debate about KN has been a debate about the conditions under which an assertion is warranted. It has not been explicitly a debate about the conditions under which a speaker can assert p in light of the fact that such an assertion is warranted. If […] Whiting's account is an account of the conditions under which a speaker can assert p in light of the fact that such an assertion is warranted, Whiting's account is […] not a rival to accounts like KN. (2014 KN. ( : 1362 As I have explained, I am not offering an account of the conditions under which a subject is in a position to make an assertion in light of the fact that it is warranted, but of the conditions 13 As it happens, I float such a constraint in the original article (2013: n32). 14 Making this move would require revising TN, specifically, restricting it to non-Moorean propositions. But, as discussed, there is an explanation for this restriction.
under which a subject is in a position to make an assertion in light of the fact which warrants doing so. In appealing to that account, am I challenging KN?
Yes. On behalf of the Truth View, I claim that truth warrants assertion. In contrast, the proponent of the Knowledge View claims that only knowledge warrants assertion. These are rival views. In addition, I claim that to have (in the relevant sense) warrant one must know the truth which provides it and that, by appeal to this idea, the proponent of TN can address the challenges which might lead one to hold KN. Moreover, I speculate in the original paper that a failure to distinguish the conditions under which there is warrant for making an assertion from those under which a speaker can assert in light of that warrant lies behind the appeal of KN (Whiting 2013: 863) .
Conclusion
I hope to have shown that Littlejohn's arguments against my attempts to defend the Truth View fail. That is, of course, not to deny that those attempts face other problems but the aim of this reply is not to address all possible objections. 15 For now, it is enough to show that by appeal to the gap between there being a warrant to assert and someone's having that warrant, and what it takes to close that gap, namely, knowledge, one might seek to defend the view that truth is the norm for assertion against one of its main competitors.
